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1System-Level Vulnerability Assessment for EME:
From Fault Tree Analysis to Bayesian
Networks—Part I: Methodology Framework
Congguang Mao, and Flavio Canavero
Abstract—The intense electromagnetic environments (EMEs),
such as the intentional electromagnetic interference and electro-
magnetic pulse, pose severe threats to the normal functions of
electric and electronic systems. A system is usually composed of
numbers of interdependently linked subsystems or equipments.
The interactions of the system and the high-power EME involve
large quantities of parameters and scenarios, so the complete tests
or computations are usually difficult to fulfill, which leads to a
hard mission to assess the system-level electromagnetic vulnera-
bility. This paper provides the thought of divide-and-rule to cope
with this problem. First, it divides the system into relatively in-
dependent and manageable subsystems, and after respective tests
and computations, the subsets of data are fused to characterize the
whole system. The key point for this assessment methodology is to
set up one model or framework to unify all the activities, which
is completed here by the causal Bayesian networks (BNs). The
system-level effects and the environment threats are characterized
with the probability theory. The modeling and parameter deter-
mining techniques are presented. Since fault tree analysis (FTA) is
also utilized in the electromagnetic risk assessment, the assessment
procedures based on relatively BN and FTA are compared. The
final results indicate that BN is capable of extending the modeling
and analysis power of FTA.
Index Terms—Assessment, bayesian networks (BNs), E3,
FTAEMI, IEMI, vulnerability.
I. INTRODUCTION
THE vulnerability of electric and electronic systemssubjected to the intense electromagnetic environments
(EMEs), such as the intentional electromagnetic interference
(IEMI) and electromagnetic pulse (EMP), may cause the seri-
ous disorder or disaster to the society, such as the power grid,
communication, and traffic command systems [1]–[4]. It is re-
garded as one hard and complex task to assess such system-level
EME effects (E3) because the task has the following features.
First, the so-called system level means it is composed of num-
bers of interdependent subsystems. During the interactions with
the EMEs, considerable quantities of couplings, propagations,
and effects will occur, and massive data need to be processed.
The scale of the complete computation and test is so huge that
sometimes they cannot be carried out, such as the distributional
or geographic systems.
Second, the parameters can vary in large ranges. For example,
incident wave can impact the system from any possible direc-
tion, and similarly, the failure threshold of one device is never a
fixed value, but distributes in a certain interval. Perhaps just for
there is uncertainty or inaccuracy in the intermediate processes
and the results, the quantification of the system-level effects
should be called the assessments, compared with the precise
measurement and calculation.
Aiming at the hardest part of the high-power electromagnetic
problem, the tests are recommended instead of the pure analysis
[1]. However, in order to organize a large-scale test, first of all a
considerate plan should be drawn up, which means one rational
and feasible analysis and assessment method to unify all the test
activities is badly necessary. This paper tries to find some tools
to help to answer this question.
Through deep observation and investigation of interactions
of the system with EMEs, it can be found that the process
involves two major societies: one is the reliability engineering
and the other is the electromagnetic compatibility (EMC). Each
of them has its own study interests and subjects. The former
puts the emphasis on the logical model and analysis of the
system structure and safety, including the reliability physics,
mathematics, test and design, etc. The latter mainly considers the
control of the electromagnetic interferences (EMIs), devoting
itself to the interference reproducing, coupling computation,
protection design and tests, etc. To build up the assessment
framework, both of them have to be integrated.
As one of the classical tools, fault tree analysis (FTA) has been
extensively applied in the reliability engineering and the risk
assessment since 1960s [5]. Recently, this method is introduced
to assess the system-level risk for IEMI [6]. On the other hand,
the Bayesian networks (BNs) theory is proposed in 1980s in
artificial intelligence (AI) fields [7], [8], and mainly in 2000s,
this method is introduced to the reliability engineering [9]. Both
the methods employ the probability theory. The Bayesian rule
is a powerful tool in the credit updating and decision of AI [7].
Of course, the probabilistic concepts are also well known for
EMC as the statistical electromagnetics [11]. So it is natural
for us to try to build the assessment methodology based on the
probability theory.
The objectives of system assessment contain two aspects:
one is to find the effects and present the risk/threat warning;
the other is to find the weak points and promote the reliability
of the system. FTA is utilized as a tool from the perspective of
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2the risk assessment [6]. This paper will employ BN to build the
assessment method from the view point of system vulnerability
and protection. The rest context is organized as follows.
It starts from FTA and introduces the primary notations and
ideas applied to the assessment in Section II. Aiming at the
shortcomings of FTA, Section III presents the concepts of BNs
and discusses how to determine the parameters of the BN model
in assessments. The complete methodology framework is given
in Section IV, followed by the comparison of FTA and BN.
Finally, the further studies needed to be done are presented in
Section V.
II. FTA JOINT EVENT TREE ANALYSIS (ETA)
FOR RISK ASSESSMENT
A. Primary Concepts
The core task of the FTA is to find all the basic components
that could cause the system function to fail and present the
promotion suggestions. The general analysis procedure is com-
pleted by two steps: the qualitative and the quantitative. The
former focuses on the fault tree (FT) modeling and reduction
into the collection of the minimal cut sets, i.e., the basic event
sets that cause the top events; and the latter mainly calculates
the probability of the top event and the importance of the other
events.
For building the FT model, first, one system failure result
is taken as the top event; then all the secondary events that
cause the top event will be analyzed and found; this process is
repeated until the root events are found. All the top, secondary
(intermediate), and root events are linked and form a hierarchical
structure, i.e., the FT model of the system. The whole process
and notations have been defined in the relevant standards or
handbooks [12].
The mathematical foundation of the traditional FTA is the
Boolean algebra. The system and subsystems mainly have two
states: success and failure denoted respectively by “0” and “1.”
The EVENT means Failure. Three typical logic relationships
will be used: AND, two secondary events must simultaneously
happen, then the upper events happen; OR, only one of two
secondary events happens, then the upper event happens; and
NOT, the two states of system or subsystem transform from
each other. These relationships are described with the Boolean
algebra as following:
AND OR NOT
1 · 1 = 1 1 + 1 = 1
1 · 0 = 0 · 1 = 0 1 + 0 = 0 + 1 = 1 1 = 0
0 · 0 = 0 0 + 0 = 0 0 = 1
.
After the FT is completed, the root events are assigned the
relevant probability values to denote their possibility of happen-
ing. Then, the probability of the intermediate and the top event
can be calculated.
B. Assessment Procedure
As aforementioned, the reliability analysis for a given system
usually conducted at two layers, i.e., the qualitative for FT mod-
eling, and the quantitative for measurement of the performance.
1) Qualitative Analysis: For a system impacted by EMEs, the
top event is the system fails to function as its design. Then all the
subsystems that could cause the top event should be found and
built as intermediate events. Each of the subsystems is analyzed
further to find which components are broken down by their
electromagnetic stresses (EMSes). The failure components are
determined and modeled as the root events. This step often
assisted by the fault mode and effects analysis.
What should be noticed in FT modeling is the implication
of the idea of the divide-and-rule. Here, the whole system is
divided into subsystem thoroughly based on the relatively in-
dependent function of the subsystems, or it can be expressed
further that the FT is the hierarchical classification of system
function. The classification level, to subsystem or components,
may be determined according to the practical requirements.
2) Quantitative Analysis: What we concern is limited on the
effects caused by the EMEs, so the other factors that cause
system failure will be excluded, such as the mechanical frac-
ture or the aging of the structures. For E3, the root events can
be determined by the stress–strength Interference (SSI) theory
[13], [14]. Set f(x) and g(y) relatively the probability density
functions (pdfs) of the electromagnetic strength/threshold of
component or subsystem Vi and its electromagnetic stress/load
EMSi , i is the code of component in FT Ci . The prerequisite
of Vi is y ≥ x. Thus, the failure probability of component PCi
is







f (x) dx (1)
where arguments x and y are just the physical quantities respon-
sible for the electromagnetic effects.
C. ETA Supplement to FTA
FTA usually focuses the failure of the system itself, where
the failure causes are the breakdown of some local components.
When FTA is applied to E3, the most initial cause of the system
fault is the EME. Genender et al. recommend from the viewpoint
of risk, if Ci denotes the ith risk, its occurring probability P (Ci)
is formulated as [6]
P (Ci) = P (Ci |Sk )P (Sk ) (2)
where P (Sk ) is the probability of the kth category of the IEMI
source Sk , and P (Ci |Sk ) is the conditional probability of Ci
under the situation of Sk . Since FTA cannot provide more in-
formation about environmental factor P (Sk ), ETA is adopted
to supplement FTA [6].
ETA is also based on the Boolean algebra. However, its logical
analysis order is from bottom to top, just contrary to FTA. It
starts from the initial event, and determine what results are led
to. This process will be iterated until the final desired events are
found. All the intentional EMEs are classified considering the
following factors: IEMI source categories (CS ), location (LS ),
and duration of the IEMI attack (D). So the probability of the
kth IEMI scenario P (Sk ) is
P (Sk ) = P (CS ) ·
n∏
i=1
P (LS (CS ,Zi)) · P (D(CS ,Zn )) (3)
3where Zn is the final investigated zone and Zi is the intermediate
zone from source to Zn . After propagation, analyzed by the
electromagnetic topology (EMT), this IEMI scenario reaches





P (Si,k ). (4)
So the risk probability of the component Ci is the sum of all




P (Ci |Sk )P (Sk ) (5)
where K is the number of all the possible IEMI scenarios.
D. Summary
The system risk for IEMI is measured by the conditional prob-
ability. In the complete risk assessment procedure, three tools
are employed: FTA for system model, ETA for environment cat-
egorization, and EMT for coupling analysis. The mathematical
foundation of FTA and ETA is Boolean algebra and probabilis-
tic theory. The greatest advantage of FTA and ETA is their clear
logic.
There are two deficiencies in the application of FTA to E3:
One is not involving the environmental analysis, which is reme-
died by the ETA and EMT. However, for the improvement of
protective design, their power about the diagnosis and location
of the weak components and critical coupling paths is insuf-
ficient. The other limit of FTA is its two-state logic. When
coping with the multistate faults, the FT model would have
to be treated especially. This is common that a system expe-
riences three states: success; logic upset; and damage of the
hardware [10].
So a more powerful tool is needed to inherit the advantages
of FTA and conquer its disadvantages.
III. BN FOR ASSESSMENT
Let us once again inspect the interaction process of the system
with the EMIs. First, the propagation of EMI is of fluxility, which
can be described by the graph model, such as EMT. Second,
the interferences and effects are of uncertainty, which can be
handled generally with probability theory. Then, what possesses
both of the characteristics seems to be the “probabilistic graph.”
Fortunately, this theory has been existed in the mathematics
society for a long time. However, it is not applied extensively. In
1980s, the important principles connecting the joint probability
and the graph model are proved to study the machine inference
with uncertainty data, which indicated a new approach was born,
named as BNs to commemorate the mathematician T. Bayes. In
the application of BN to reliability engineering, the transform
method from FT to BN has been promoted [15], which means FT
and ET can also modeled by the graph. Thus, at least in the style,
three tools FT, ET, and EMT can be unified into a probabilistic
graph BN model. This encourages us to build the methodology
framework of the system-level vulnerability assessment for the
Fig. 1. Derivation of BNs.
IEMI based on BN [16]–[18]. The train of thought is shown in
Fig. 1.
A. Primary Concepts
1) About Probability Theory: Because BN is founded on the
probability and graph theory, the relative probability formula is
introduced first, which will guide our building of assessment
methodology.
The probability must conform to three basic axioms as fol-
lows:
1) 0 ≤ P (x) ≤ 1;
2) P (x) = 0, impossible event; P (x) = 1, certain;
3) P (x ∪ y) = P (x) + P (y), if X ∩ Y = ∅.
Three rules play an important role in the application.
1) Product formulation for joint probability
The BN theory mainly addresses the factorization of a joint
probability distribution, so the product formulation is the core
of BN. Given two sets, if probability P (A) > 0 andP (B) > 0
P (A,B) = P (A|B)P (B) = P (B|A)P (B). (6)
This rule can be extended to more sets.
2) Total probability formulation
For BN inference from reason to results, the total probability
formulation will be used, which is the case of the risk assessment
of system for IEMI. If a total set Ω can be divided into a series
of subsets {Bi} , i = 1, . . . , I , Bi ∩Bi+1 = ∅ and ∪Bi = Ω




P (A|Bi)P (Bi). (7)
3) The Bayesian formulation
Another major application of BN is to diagnosis the reasons
against some results, where the Bayesian formulation is vital.
Given the conditions of the total probability formulation, the
conditional probability
P (Bj |A) = P (A|Bj )P (Bj )∑I
i=1 P (A|Bi)P (Bi)
, j = 1, ..., I. (8)
2) About BN Theory: A BN is a two-element entirety, BN =
BN 〈G,P 〉 [7], one element is the graphic model G and the
other is the probability P, which just constitute two respects, the
qualitative structure and the quantitative parameter.
Moreover, the graph model G is also a two-element entirety,
usually denoted as G = G 〈V,E〉 : V = {X1 ,X2 , . . . , Xn},
stand for the random variables and the edges E for the dependent
relationships between the nodes.
In order to avoid the cycle reasoning, the loops are forbid-
den in BN. So BN is a specific type of graph, named directed
4Fig. 2. Three typical connection of BN. (a) Series. (b) Converging. (c) Di-
verging.
acyclic graph (DAG). In DAG, the conditional independence is
represented by the d-separation. Given three variables X, Y, and
Z in one BN, and Z exclusive X and Y, if all the paths between X
and Y are blocked by Z, then we call Z d-separate X and Y, and
denote by X⊥Y |Z. Further, if X is conditionally independent to
Y, the conditional probability function P (x|y) = P (x). So the
concept of d-separation can reduce the complexity of the joint
probability.
BN factorizes a joint probability distribution along the DAG
and based on the conditional independence. Since the edges
denote the causal relationships, BN is also named casual net-
works. The start point of one arrow is called the parent vertex
and the terminate point called the descendant vertex. Given re-
sult variable xi , all of its parent variables, i.e., causal vertices, are
denoted as pa(xi). Then, based on the concept of d-separation,
the joint probability factorized with BN is expressed as [8], [9]
P (x1 , x2 , . . . , xn ) =
n∏
i=1
P (xi |pa(xi)). (9)
In addition, there are three typical structures in DAG: se-
rial, converging, and diverging (see Fig. 2). The serial structure
can describe the progressive relation, and is similar with the
chain rule of the conditional probability. If the probability of
events X, Y, and Z is relatively P (x), P (y), P (z), P (z|x), and
P (y|z), then P (x, y, z) = P (x)P (z|x)P (y|z). The converging
structure represents a number of causes for one result. There are
two cases for depending on the logic relationship between X, Y,
and Z. If X and Y are independent and sufficient conditions for
Z, then P (x, y, z) = P (z|x)P (x) + P (z|y)P (y); if two neces-
sary conditions X and Y compose the sufficient condition for Z,
then P (x, y, z) = P (x)P (y)P (z|x, y). The diversion structure
stands for several results for one reason. The joint probability
P (x, y, z) = P (z)P (x|z)P (y|z).
B. Assessment Procedure
There exists a definite causal relationship in the EME effects
(E3). The ambient electromagnetic energy induces responses
on conducting structures, the EMSes on the ports breakdown
the components or upset the equipments, and the local damages
impact whole system functions. Such causal logics are essential
to the BN application to E3, which is ensured by the physical
disciplines and be used over and again.
So there are two principles that are well worth adopted in our
application. On the one hand, the relations between nodes are
determined by the physical processes, but not only by the sta-
tistical data. On the other hand, the physical computations will
be prior to the purely statistical description when the physical
equations can hold, which helps to reduce the uncertainty in the
assessment results.
Equivalent to the qualitative and quantitative analysis in FT
application, there are also two steps in BN analysis: first, build-
ing the BN model, and second, assigning the probability values
to the vertices and computing, which in BN society are called
as structure learning and parameter learning.
1) Structure Learning—Qualitative Analysis: There are three
classes of methods for the BN structure learning [7]: the search
and score techniques utilize a preset score function to search all
the variables to find the BN structure with the highest score; the
constrains-based methods generally test the conditional inde-
pendence relation with some constrains or principles that have
been defined beforehand; and the hybrid both of them. As dis-
cussed above, the definite causal logics in the E3 can help us to
build the BN structure, which obviously belongs to the second
category.
Usually, the causal analysis starts from the reason and termi-
nate at the result. As mentioned above, the EME is the cause
and the system effect is the result. So from the exterior of the
system into the interior along the EMI and the faults propagation
direction, the BN model can be built independently, without the
help of other tools. Obviously, this belongs to the second-class
modeling method.
The representations of ET, FT, and EMT [6] in BN are de-
picted through three analysis phases, environments, coupling,
and final system effects. Their ideas can be absorbed in BN
modeling.
a) Event Tree Analysis: The different categories of the
IEMI sources that reach one zone Zn can be modeled as the
converging structure (see Fig. 1), i.e., multireason for one re-
sults, and the electromagnetic wave propagates from zone Zi−1
to Zi may be incorporated into EMT. Then, ET starts from
the sources and terminated the zone Zn , which is the space of
system located.
b) Electromagnetic Topology: Following ET, EMT starts
from the ambient environment of system in zone Zn , and termi-
nates at the victim components.
EMT model is identical with BN. EMT regards the E3 as the
onion diagram, i.e., starting from the EME outside the system
shielding barrier EMI propagates layer by layer into the victims
of components or ports inside the system. Since only the equip-
ment susceptibility is considered, and not the reflection wave
from the system, EMT model is also the DAG. The vertices in
EMT denote the fields in the free space or the components. The
edges in EMT are the propagation paths of EMI.
Here, one issue must be noticed that the failure of compo-
nents could be caused by two categories of interferences, the
radiated and the conducted, which relatively correspond to the
radiated and conducted susceptibility. The EMSes of the former
are the free fields, and the latter the currents or voltages. This
means actually the EMT will stop at the EMSes, which are the
direct causes of components failure. Between the ambient envi-
ronment of system and the local EMSes on components, there
exist complex coupling paths depicted by EMT.
c) Fault Tree Analysis: For the system modeling, the BN
can be transformed from FT if available [15], or be modeled
5Fig. 3. Comparison of FT [6] and BN model. (a) FT. (b) BN.
directly based on the causal diagram: from lower layer to the up-
per layer, i.e., from the components to the subsystem/equipment
and finally to the whole system, all of them are modeled as ver-
tices of BN, and their dependent relationships the edges.
The examples for the FT and BN are illustrated in Fig. 3.
The faults of subsystem A OR B, V7 OR V8 in BN, will lead
the system (V9) failure. The subsystem A (V8) failure could
be caused by EMS1 (V4). However, the subsystem B (V7) is
supported by components A AND B (V5 AND V6), whose EMSes
are relatively EMS2 and EMS3 (V2 and V3). FT includes these
EMSes in the EVENTs and stops, whereas the BN can further
model the cause of the EMEes, IEMI, as the root nodes (V1).
All the relationships between the vertices are denoted as the
conditional probabilities, except the original node V1 . The joint
probability P (V1 , V2 , . . . , V9) will be formulated in the next
section.
What should be noticed is that three tools, ETA, EMT and
FTA, employ the causal logic. Only the application angles are
different: ETA from the fault effect, EMT from the interference
propagation, and FTA from the system function. Since the causal
relationship is just the core of BN, there are no obstacles in
transforming three kinds of models to BN.
2) Parameter Learning—Quantitative Analysis: Following
the BN modeling is the parameter learning, which will present
all the parameters and their determination techniques for system
vulnerability assessments.
From the perspective of the probability theory, the failure
probability of system PV contains two major factors: the system
V and EMEs. For comparison with FTA, only IEMI is taken as
an example. So joint probability
PV = PV (V, IEMI). (10)
Based on BN, the causal relationship can be expressed by the
conditional probability, i.e., the product formulation (6)
PV (V, IEMI) = PV (V |IEMI)P (IEMI). (11)
Actually, it is the radiation susceptibility of the total sys-
tem. If the system effects need more detailed check and diag-
nostic, the completed scenarios should be investigated: IEMI
produce the ambient environment of system (AEME) and fur-
ther EM stress (Stres) on the components, and the components
breakdown (Comp) lead to the subsystem upset (Subs), and
ultimately to the function failure of the whole system (see Fig. 1).
This physical and logical scenario can be formulated as the joint
probability equation and the series of causal relationships
PV (V,AEME) = P (V |Subs)P (Subs|Comp)
×P (Comp, Stres)P (Stres|AEME)
×P (AEME|IEMI)P (IEMI). (12)
In reliability engineering, 12 is called as system structural
function. There are three classes of probabilities in the formula-
tion: about system, junction of system and EMSes, and for IEMI.
Corresponding to the analysis procedure in structure learning,
the determination techniques and the physical sensations of all
the parameters are presented as follows.
a) P(IEMI): If IEMI is divided into k classes and these sub-
sets Sk pose threats to system, this relationship can be described
by the total probability formulation. So the value-assignment
method of the probability P (Sk ) should abide by the precondi-
tion of (7).
First, all the IEMI environments are partitioned into subset







{Sk} = ∅. (13)
Second, every subset is assigned one value P ′(Sk ) based
on the experts’ analysis and judge for source categories (CS ),
location (LS ), and duration of the IEMI attack (D). Finally, all
the values are normalized and the new values are taken as the
desired probabilities, which are the measurements of the EMEs







The larger of P(Sk ) means the greater threats. Two extreme
limits 0 and 1, respectively, indicate no threat and threat in-
evitable existing. Based on the Boolean rule of OR, it is per-
mitted that in FTA P (Sk ) = 1(k = 1, . . . ,K). However, in BN
they are forbidden because all the probability values must meet
the demand of the basic probability axioms.
b) P (AEME|IEMI) and P (Stres|AEME): From the
IEMI source to the system, the electromagnetic wave could have
to pass through some barriers, for instance, the buildings. This
propagation path can be described by the conditional probability
of P (AEME|IEMI). From the threat perspective, the higher
coupling efficiency makes the greater probability value.
If several IEMI sources, Sk (k = 1, . . . ,K), simultaneously
reach the system, (7) should be employed, which is equivalent
to the logic of one result with several causes, i.e.,
P (AEME, IEMI) =
K∑
i=1
P (AEME|Sk )P (Sk ). (15)
Chosen one category of IEMI, the electromagnetic wave out-
side the system propagates to the component and induces the
EM stress, which can be described by the pdf g(y), and
∫ ym a x
ym in
g(y)dy = 1, y ∈ [ymin , ymax]. (16)
6Fig. 4. Failure probability of component in BN.
The stress probability P (stres|AEME) can be assigned val-
ues based on the three categories of properties: AEME outside
the system, coupling paths, and component susceptibilities. This
parameter may be regarded as the explicit measurement of cou-
pling efficiency in the BN model. It indicates no effects, if
P (stres|AEME) = 0.
Here, if the electromagnetic thresholds of components f (x)
are available, P (stres|AEME) is proportional to the overlap-
ping portion of the stresses with the strength, i.e.,
P (stres|AEME) ∝
∫ ym a x
xm in
gk (y)dy, y ∈ [xmin , ymax].
(17)
c) P (Comp, Stres): This probability may be determined
by the SSI theory, which has been discussed in Section III-
B1.c. However, the physical sensation need be severely deduced
according to the BN theorem.
First, the overlaying portion of two functions is divided into
n intervals with dx = dy, and in the ith interval, the values of
arguments, xi = yi (see Fig. 4). Every interval can be regarded
as an event with occurring probabilities Fi = f(xi)dx and Gi =
g(yi) dy. Under the condition of the causal event Gi , all the
events with xj ≤ yi (j = 1, 2, . . . , i) will happen. So based on
the total probability formulation (7), the conditional probability
of the component failure




and the joint probability of the cause and result





The total probability of the components is the sum of all the
discrete events, i.e.,
























This result is just the same with the SSI. The deduction pro-
cess indicates that what the SSI formulation presents is the joint
probability P (Comp, Stres), but not the conditional probabil-
ity P (Comp|Stres).
The event of the component failure is the result of the IEMI
and the cause of the system fault. So this factor is the core of
E3, and the task of BN is just to help to identify every sensitive
component and causal scenario.
d) P (Subs|Comp) and P (V |Subs): These two param-
eters describe the system structure and are equivalent to
FT. The values can be assigned by the similar technique to
P (AEME|IEMI). With the probability theory replacing the
Boolean algebra, multistate variable can be processed using
total probability formulation. For example, if three states are
considered, one component node is extended into three, and
three edges link the upper subsystem node.
C. System Assessment
1) System Failure Probability: With all the probability values
mentioned above, the failure probability of the whole system can
be expressed as





P (V |Subsm,n )P (Subsm,n ) (19)
where N is the number of the subsystem that can directly cause
the system breakdown and M is the number of the redundant
subsystem. The failure of subsystems is deduced by its compo-
nents, so





P (Subsm,n |Compm,n,i,j )
×P (Compm,n,i,j ) (20)
where the sensation of i and j are similar to n and m. The effects
of component are caused by its EMSes, so





The stresses include all the cases induced by all sorts of IEMI




[P (Stresm,n,i,j |EMEm,n,i,j,p,k )
×P (EMEm,n,i,j,p,k |Sk )P (Sk )]. (22)
If the category of IEMI is chosen, P (Sk ) becomes a constant,
i.e.,
P (Sk )P (EMEk |Sk ) = Cpsk . (23)
7Fig. 5. Comparison of assessment procedures based on FTA and BN. (a) FTA.
(b) BN.
Further if the probabilities P (Subsm,n |Compm,n,i,j ) and
P (V |Subsm,n ) are only assigned two values 0 and 1, the sys-
tem failure probability gets almost identical with FT, except
P (Stresi,j ) = 1, i.e.,





P (Compi,j |Stresi,j )P (Stresi,j ).
(24)
2) System Diagnosis: For the performance certification of
protective design, it is critical to find the weak components and
the dominant coupling paths.
If the system effect has been found, the probability of the
component diagnosed to be the cause can be calculated based
on the Bayesian rule (8)
P (Compi,j |V ) = P (V |Compi,j )P (Compi,j )
PV (V, IEMI)
. (25)
Further, the probability about the coupling mechanism or
propagation paths is
P (Stresp |Compi,j ) = P (Compi,j |Stresp)P (Stresp)
P (Cpmpi,j |V ) .
(26)
More detailed introduction is presented in [15].
IV. METHODS COMPARISON
The assessment procedure of FTA and BN are shown in Fig. 5.
FTA method employs three models of FT, EMT, and ET. In com-
parison, BN method can integrate the three tools into one graph
model. The environmental factor is directly involved in the sys-
tem structural function of BN (see 12), while in FT, it is only
implicitly contained in the bottom event as the stress probability
(see 5). Thus, the importance of environmental factor and the
component can be measured equally. Moreover, taking the place
of Boolean algebra and logic series with the probability theory
and graph, the multistate fault can be easily modeled. Given the
specific values, BN can be reduced into FT. What’s more ben-
eficial is that BN can conduct the bidirectional inferences, one
for risk evaluation and the other for weak components location.
The data play a vital role in the vulnerability assessment,
and are acquired by means of the calculation and testing. This
implies that the BN method depends on the physical interaction
of the electromagnetic wave and systems. On the other hand,
under the BN framework, the interaction of system and the
EME can be divided into series of nodes including the original
EME, various coupling path and mechanisms, fault modes and
effects. All the phenomena can be studied independently with
different approaches. Since the size of every node is less than
the whole system’s, the difficulty of calculation and test can be
reduced greatly. So BN method is beneficial for the deep study
of system-level effects.
As mentioned above, the tests are recommended for the sys-
tem assessment. If no detailed analysis and local examinations
were conducted beforehand, there are two possible kinds of
risks for the whole system illumination: no effects and system
damages. BN can provide an order from the preanalysis and
component sensitivity examination to the complete test or as-
sessment of the system.
V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
The system-level vulnerability for IEMI, as a very compre-
hensive work, needs many techniques and tools. With the prin-
ciple of divide-and-rule, this paper devoted itself to set up a
methodology framework to integrate various parts of task, such
as the analysis, test, computation and data fusion, etc.
The FTA is first utilized and the advantages and disadvantages
are pointed out. In order to extend the power of FTA, BN is
introduced and the assessment framework for the system-level
E3 is set up. Based on the physical process and causal relation,
the interaction of systems and EME is modeled into a DAG.
The system effects and EME are formulated respectively as the
conditional and marginal probabilities.
All of these indicate that BN is capable of inheriting the
advantage of FTA and overcoming its limits. So BN method is
well worth recommending, although FTA has been applied in
extensive fields.
This paper puts the emphasis on the methodology presenta-
tion. An application of the method including the test is presented
in another paper. The other topics about the common cause fail-
ure model, importance analysis, and dynamic model can be seen
in [9] and [17].
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